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Research Note—Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies

Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260
aradhna{at}umich.edu
uunver{at}pitt.edu

Registrars' offices at most universities face the daunting task of allocating course seats to students. Because demand exceeds supply for many courses, course allocation needs to be done equitably and efficiently. Many schools use bidding systems in which student bids are used both to infer preferences over courses and to determine student priorities for courses. However, this dual role of bids can result in course allocations not being market outcomes, and in unnecessary efficiency loss, which can potentially be avoided with the use of an appropriate market mechanism. We report the result of field and laboratory studies that compare a typical course-bidding mechanism with the alternate Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market mechanism. Results from the field study (conducted at the Ross School of Business, University of Michigan) suggest that using the latter could vastly improve efficiency of course allocation systems while facilitating market outcomes. Laboratory experiments with greater design control confirm the superior efficiency of the Gale-Shapley mechanism. The paper tests theory that has important practical implications because it has the potential to affect the learning experience of very large numbers of students enrolled in educational institutions.

Key Words: auction; bidding; consumer behavior; experimental economics; field experiment; indivisible goods; market design; matching; mechanism design
History: Received: February 27, 2006;

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